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THE CITY OF CINCINNATI, APPELLEE, v. TESTA, TAX COMMR., APPELLANT.
[Cite as Cincinnati v. Testa, 143 Ohio St.3d 371, 2015-Ohio-1775.]
Real-property taxation—Exemption for public property used for public purpose—
R.C. 5709.08—Golf course operated by private, for-profit company.
(No. 2014-0531—Submitted February 25, 2015—Decided May 14, 2015.)
APPEAL from the Board of Tax Appeals, Nos. 2011-143, 2011-144, 2011-145,
2011-146, 2011-147, and 2011-148.
____________________
FRENCH, J.
{¶ 1} This appeal addresses a claim of exemption from real-property tax
for several golf courses owned by appellee, the city of Cincinnati, and operated
under a management contract by a private, for-profit contractor, Billy Casper Golf
Management, Inc. (“Golf Management”).

Paul Macke, a private golf-course

operator who owns taxable real property in Hamilton County, challenged the
ongoing exemption of the courses as public property used exclusively for a public
purpose.

After reviewing Macke’s complaints, appellant, the Ohio tax

commissioner, determined that the exemption should be revoked and that the golf
courses should be subject to real-property tax. Cincinnati appealed to the Board
of Tax Appeals (“BTA”), which reversed the commissioner’s determination and
allowed the exemption.
{¶ 2} On appeal to this court, the tax commissioner contends that
Cincinnati’s contractual arrangement with a for-profit company to manage and
operate the golf courses defeats the tax exemption under R.C. 5709.08 on the
grounds that the golf courses are no longer public property used exclusively for a
public purpose. We disagree with the tax commissioner, and we affirm the
BTA’s reasonable and lawful decision.

SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

Facts and procedural background
{¶ 3} Cincinnati owns the golf courses at issue here, and pursuant to the
city charter, the Cincinnati Recreation Commission (“CRC”) has the right to
furnish, equip, and operate the city-owned golf courses. CRC operates the golf
courses as part of its “mission * * * to provide recreational and cultural activities
enhancing health and wellness, [and] creating a sense of community * * * for
everyone that lives in the City of Cincinnati and the tri-state area.”
{¶ 4} The issue of the golf courses’ exemption from real-property taxation
has arisen since CRC began contracting with private companies to manage and
operate the courses. In 2003, CRC entered into a management contract with its
current contractor, Golf Management.

A subsequent management contract

between CRC and Golf Management was executed in 2011 and certified in 2012.
{¶ 5} The management contracts recite the city’s ownership and operation
of seven (later six) public golf courses and express the city’s “desire[] to obtain
management services.” The management contracts require Golf Management to
provide a defined “scope of services,” as set out in a 25-page exhibit. In general,
Golf Management’s services include “normal supervisory[,] management and
operational services associated with public golf courses in a municipal setting.”
More particularly, Golf Management’s duties include the following: (1)
“exclusive responsibility and control over all areas and structures within the
boundaries of the golf premises,” (2) supervision of golf clubhouse operations,
including the sale of golf merchandise, golf cart operations, and golf programs,
(3) establishment and implementation of “a grounds maintenance program, and
agronomic and horticultural operations to assure the proper playing conditions,”
and (4) provision of human-resources services for golf-course employees, all of
whom are employees of Golf Management.
{¶ 6} The management contracts require Golf Management to deposit all
golf-course proceeds except sales of food and beverages, merchandise, and golf
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lessons into a CRC account, to be disbursed in accordance with the CRC’s
protocols and procedures. As the BTA found, CRC receives all golf-course
operating revenues, including greens fees and cart-rental fees.
{¶ 7} Payments under the management contracts run in two directions:
CRC pays Golf Management a monthly management fee, and Golf Management
pays CRC a percentage of gross food, beverage, and merchandise sales. The 2003
contract called for a monthly management fee of $16,666.66, and the 2012
contract called for a monthly management fee of $13,750.1 Both contracts offer
Golf Management an incentive fee for achieving a revenue target, but that target
has never been hit. With respect to food and beverage sales, the 2003 contract
required Golf Management to annually pay CRC the greater of 17 percent or
$200,000, and the 2012 contract required a payment of the greater of 20 percent
or $220,000. Finally, the 2003 contract required Golf Management to pay 7
percent of the golf-shop merchandise sales to CRC; the 2012 contract required
payment of 10 percent of merchandise sales.
{¶ 8} Pursuant to section 14 of the 2003 contract, Golf Management was
an independent contractor. The 2012 contract, however, amended that section and
states, “In operating the Golf Courses, entering into cont[r]acts relating to the
Golf Courses, the Contractor acts on behalf of and as an agent for the [CRC].”
{¶ 9} Macke challenged the golf courses’ ongoing exemption from realproperty tax in complaints filed at various times in 2009 and 2010. The tax
commissioner issued final determinations in December 2010 and, in each case,
granted the complaint and denied exemption. The tax commissioner relied on the
following factors: (1) the alleged generation of profits by the golf courses, (2)
Golf Management’s status as an independent contractor, (3) the “privatization” of

1

The 2012 contract involved only six golf courses; the 2003 contract involved seven.
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the courses evidenced by waiver of city living-wage requirements, and (4) the
supposed competition with private golf courses.
{¶ 10} Cincinnati appealed to the BTA, which consolidated the cases and
held a hearing on May 7, 2013. Cincinnati offered as evidence the 2003 and 2012
management contracts, along with other documents and the testimony of three
persons: (1) Christopher Bigham, CRC’s director, (2) Steve Pacella,
superintendent of administrative services for CRC, and (3) Joseph Livingood,
senior vice president of Golf Management. The tax commissioner offered brief
testimony from Macke and introduced documentation, including Cincinnati’s
request for proposals (“RFP”) for golf-management services, Golf Management’s
2002 response to the RFP, and documents relating to financial matters.
{¶ 11} On March 6, 2014, the BTA issued a consolidated decision
reversing the tax commissioner’s denial of exemptions based on two main
considerations. First, the BTA rejected the tax commissioner’s reliance on Parma
Hts. v. Wilkins, 105 Ohio St.3d 463, 2005-Ohio-2818, 828 N.E.2d 998. The BTA
distinguished Parma Hts. based on the lack of a lease between CRC and Golf
Management and the terms of the management contracts. BTA Nos. 2011-143
through 2011-148, 2014 WL 1155680, *3 (Mar. 6, 2014). The board found that
Cincinnati, via CRC, exercises “significant authority” over the golf courses and
that Golf Management “simply carries out the day-to-day operations of the
courses according to CRC’s direction and control.” Id. Second, the board noted
that Cincinnati reaps the financial benefit of most of the golf-course revenues,
including all operating revenues, and that Golf Management’s revenues from
food, beverage, and merchandise sales are “incidental” under the authority of
South-Western City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Kinney, 24 Ohio St.3d 184, 494 N.E.2d
1109 (1986). Finally, the BTA noted that Cincinnati, not Golf Management, is
responsible for the payment of real-property taxes and that, unlike the exemption
in Parma Hts., the exemption here will benefit the city, not a private entity.
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{¶ 12} The tax commissioner appealed to this court, pursuant to R.C.
5717.04. Macke also filed a notice of appeal, but he failed to perfect his appeal as
required by statute, and we therefore dismissed his notice of appeal and
redesignated his briefs as amicus briefs in support of the tax commissioner’s
position. 141 Ohio St.3d 1465, 2015-Ohio-428, 24 N.E.3d 1183.
Analysis
{¶ 13} The BTA’s findings of fact are entitled to deference. Satullo v.
Wilkins, 111 Ohio St.3d 399, 2006-Ohio-5856, 856 N.E.2d 954, ¶ 14, citing Am.
Natl. Can Co. v. Tracy, 72 Ohio St.3d 150, 152, 648 N.E.2d 483 (1995). This
court will not reverse the BTA’s determination as to the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be given to their testimony absent an abuse of discretion. EOPBP Tower, L.L.C. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 1, 2005Ohio-3096, 829 N.E.2d 686, ¶ 14. Legal issues attending the manner in which
statutes have been construed and applied, however, call for de novo review.
Akron Centre Plaza, L.L.C. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision, 128 Ohio St.3d 145,
2010-Ohio-5035, 942 N.E.2d 1054, ¶ 10.
{¶ 14} In Ohio, taxation is the rule, and exemption is the exception.
Vought Industries, Inc. v. Tracy, 72 Ohio St.3d 261, 264, 648 N.E.2d 1364
(1995), citing Cleveland v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 153 Ohio St. 97, 99-100, 91
N.E.2d 480 (1950). The well-established rule in tax-exemption cases—generally
articulated in cases involving a property owner’s application for an exemption—
places the burden on the taxpayer to show that the exemption statute’s language
clearly expresses the exemption in relation to the claim.

Anderson/Maltbie

Partnership v. Levin, 127 Ohio St.3d 178, 2010-Ohio-4904, 937 N.E.2d 547, ¶ 16.
But when a taxpayer, like Macke here, challenges the continued exemption of real
property, “the burden of proof is upon the complaining taxpayer to produce
sufficient evidence to substantiate his allegations that the property should lose its
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exemption.” Vick v. Cleveland Mem. Med. Found., 2 Ohio St.2d 30, 206 N.E.2d 2
(1965), paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 15} The issue before us is whether the statutes allow the exemption for
the golf courses in light of the largely undisputed facts. This presents a question
of law for our plenary review. See Equity Dublin Assocs. v. Testa, 142 Ohio St.3d
152, 2014-Ohio-5243, 28 N.E.3d 1206, ¶ 22.
{¶ 16} The tax commissioner’s first proposition of law states that taxexemption statutes “must be strictly construed, because exemptions are in
derogation of the rights of all other taxpayers.” This is a correct statement of the
law with which Cincinnati agrees. See, e.g., Panther II Transp., Inc. v. Seville Bd.
of Income Tax Rev., 138 Ohio St.3d 495, 2014-Ohio-1011, 8 N.E.3d 904, ¶ 23.
But, as Cincinnati states, interpretation of tax-exemption statutes must also be
reasonable and not defeat the legislative intent. In re Estate of Morgan, 173 Ohio
St. 89, 93, 180 N.E.2d 146 (1962). With these standards in mind, we turn to the
statutory authority for the tax exemption in this case.
{¶ 17} All real property in Ohio is subject to taxation unless expressly
exempted. R.C. 5709.01(A). At issue here is the exemption stated in R.C.
5709.08(A)(1) for “public property used exclusively for a public purpose.”
Property qualifies for that exemption when it satisfies three prerequisites: “(1) the
property must be public property, (2) the use thereof must be for a public purpose,
and (3) the property must be used exclusively for a public purpose.” Carney v.
Cleveland, 173 Ohio St. 56, 180 N.E.2d 14 (1962), paragraph one of the syllabus.
Only the third requirement is at issue here.
{¶ 18} The tax commissioner’s second, third, and fourth propositions of
law concern the requirement that the golf courses be used exclusively for a public
purpose. Collectively, those propositions state that public property is not used
exclusively for a public purpose when a for-profit entity operates a for-profit
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business on the property, in competition with other private entities in the area,
with the intent to profit, or as the functional equivalent of a lessee.
{¶ 19} We first look to R.C. 5709.121(A), which declares certain property
to be used exclusively for charitable or public purposes and states:

Real property * * * belonging to * * * a political
subdivision, shall be considered as used exclusively for * * *
public purposes by such * * * political subdivision, if it meets one
of the following requirements:
(1) It is used by such * * * political subdivision, or by one
or more other * * * political subdivisions under a lease, sublease,
or other contractual arrangement:
(a) [As an arts center];
(b) For other * * * public purposes.
(2) It is made available under the direction or control of
such * * * political subdivision for use in furtherance of or
incidental to its * * * public purposes and not with the view to
profit.

The provision most applicable here is R.C. 5709.121(A)(2). Cincinnati makes the
golf courses available to golfers who enjoy their accommodations, and the
essence of the public purpose is to make the golf courses available for use by the
public.
{¶ 20} Under R.C. 5709.121(A)(2), three elements must be satisfied in
order to conclude that the golf courses in this case are used exclusively for a
public purpose and are, therefore, entitled to a tax exemption. First, they must be
“under the direction or control of” Cincinnati. The BTA expressly found that
Cincinnati “continues to exercise significant authority over the subject golf
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courses.” BTA Nos. 2011-143 through 2011-148, 2014 WL 1155680, *3. The
operation of the courses is subject to extensive supervision by Cincinnati, and
CRC had to approve decisions regarding management and operation of the golf
courses.

For example, CRC retained authority over rate-setting, approval of

marketing, and hours of operation. CRC’s golf-audit team inspects the courses
weekly, and Rob Williams, the city’s supervisor of golf, is in the field inspecting
the courses “[b]asically daily.” This reliable and probative evidence supports the
BTA’s finding regarding Cincinnati’s ongoing direction and control, and it merits
deference.
{¶ 21} Second, the property’s use must be “in furtherance of or incidental
to [Cincinnati’s] public purposes.” Bigham testified that CRC operates the golf
courses consistent with its mission to “provide recreational and cultural activities
enhancing health and wellness.” There can be no question that the golf courses
continue to be used to make golfing available to the general public. Bigham
testified to CRC’s mission “to really provide services for everyone.” As in SouthWestern City Schools, 24 Ohio St.3d 184, 494 N.E.2d 1109, another case
involving the tax-exempt status of a municipal golf course, no one contends that
operating golf courses is not a valid public function, and we accept that it is.
{¶ 22} Third, the property must be made available to others not with a
view to profit.

Satisfaction of this requirement is the primary point of

disagreement here. The tax commissioner argues that the golf courses were
operated for profit because Golf Management is a for-profit enterprise seeking
profit through the management contract and because the golf-course operations
were designed to generate sufficient revenue to offset expenses and potentially
generate a surplus. Regarding revenue sharing and profit potential, the BTA
found as follows:
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Under the management contract, the City receives all
operating revenues, including greens fees and cart rentals fees,
which it reinvests into the golf facilities. [Golf Management] only
receives a flat management fee, a portion of merchandise and food
and beverage sales, and may receive an incentive fee if certain
revenue targets are met. This is therefore not a situation where a
private enterprise is occupying publicly-owned property and
profiting thereby; instead, the fruit of [Golf Management’s] labor
is largely reaped by the City. [Golf Management] receives only a
portion of the revenue from merchandise and food and beverage
sales * * *. Such revenues are incidental and do not violate the
“exclusively for a public purpose requirement” of R.C. 5709.08.

2014 WL 1155680, *3. In so holding, the BTA focused on the proportion of the
revenue retained by Golf Management in relation to the revenue generated for
CRC’s municipal golf fund; the BTA found that Golf Management’s share
constituted no more than 5 percent of the revenue to the golf fund. Our review
confirms that the record supports the BTA’s conclusion.
{¶ 23} The tax commissioner argues that the BTA erred by not
considering Golf Management’s contractual management fee in its comparison,
but the BTA was justified in excluding the management fee from its
consideration. The management fee is a flat fee for the service of managing the
courses; it does not constitute “profit” that would violate the limitation of R.C.
5709.121(A)(2).

The management contracts entitle Golf Management to its

management fee regardless of how the golf courses perform.
{¶ 24} The documentation regarding the municipal golf fund is also
persuasive.

The average revenue per year from 2007 through 2012 was

$6,206,508, and the average expenses were $6,365,044, for an average loss of
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$158,536 per year over the six-year period. The fund sustained itself over this
period with the carry-forward of the previous year’s balance, together with the
surplus realized in two of the six years: 2007 with a $461,651 surplus and 2009
with a $460,344 surplus. Over the long haul, though, the municipal golf fund can
fairly be characterized as operating on a close-to-break-even basis.
{¶ 25} Aside from the amount of revenue realized by either Golf
Management or the municipal golf fund from operation of the golf courses, when
private use of public land is sufficiently incidental to the public purpose, the land
may still be characterized as being used exclusively for a public purpose.
Whitehouse v. Tracy, 72 Ohio St.3d 178, 181, 648 N.E.2d 503 (1995).

In

Whitehouse, a village allowed a local farmer to grow crops for personal profit on
portions of a public well field, and this court affirmed the BTA’s determination
that the farming was not the type of activity that would defeat the tax exemption
for the well field, as public property used exclusively for a public purpose. Id. at
182. Likewise, in Carney v. Ohio Turnpike Comm., 167 Ohio St. 273, 276, 147
N.E.2d 857 (1958), we held that turnpike service plazas, which were rented to
private corporations to sell food, drink, gasoline, and other goods, were
“concomitants of the turnpike operation” and that their private operation did not
defeat an exemption for public property operated exclusively for a public purpose.
Again, in Cleveland v. Carney, 172 Ohio St. 189, 196, 174 N.E.2d 254 (1961), we
concluded that use of part of a public auditorium and exhibit hall for public
parking was “only a small incidental part of the overall use, insufficient to destroy
the tax-exempt character of a facility which in the main is used exclusively for a
public purpose,” despite a statute providing that municipal real property acquired
for off-street parking is not tax-exempt. The focus in those cases was not on the
revenue realized as a result of the challenged uses, but on the incidental character
of the private use in relation to the public purpose. Here, the sales of food,
beverages, and merchandise from which Golf Management derived revenue are
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incidental to the public purpose of making the golf courses available to the
general public.
{¶ 26} In South-Western City Schools, 24 Ohio St.3d at 186, 494 N.E.2d
1109, we applied a prior version of R.C. 5709.121, and specifically the language
now appearing in subsection (A)(2), to determine that a municipal golf course
satisfied an exemption under R.C. 5709.08. We accepted that operation of a
municipal golf course serves a public purpose and considered only whether the
golf course was used exclusively for a public purpose.

The school board

challenging the exemption argued that the golf course was not used exclusively
for a public purpose, because a snack shop, pro shop, and efficiency apartment
located on the premises were operated to generate profits or to benefit private
persons. We rejected those arguments. We held that the apartment rental ensured
that someone would usually be at the golf course during evening hours and was
“for a purpose incidental to the course’s public purpose and not with a view to
profit.” Id. at 187. We further held that neither the operation of the pro shop nor
the operation of the snack shop, which was leased to a private concessioner,
violated the requirement that the property be used exclusively for a public
purpose. The record contained no evidence of the revenue realized by the pro
shop or the snack shop, and we stated that any profit may have been
“inconsequential and trivial.” Id. As in South-Western City Schools, and for
these reasons, the golf courses meet the requirements for exclusive public use
under R.C. 5709.121(A)(2).
{¶ 27} The tax commissioner takes issue with the BTA’s reliance on the
lack of a lease in this case to distinguish Parma Hts., 105 Ohio St.3d 463, 2005Ohio-2818, 828 N.E.2d 998, in which this court affirmed the denial of an
exemption for a municipally owned ice rink that the city leased to a private entity.
The tax commissioner presents a twofold argument. First, he contends that “[t]he
presence or absence of a lease agreement between the parties, by itself, has no
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bearing on whether an R.C. 5709.08 exemption is appropriate.” Alternatively, he
argues that the relationship between CRC and Golf Management is the functional
equivalent of a lessor/lessee relationship and is, therefore, indistinguishable from
the relationship between Parma Heights and its lessee.
{¶ 28} The tax commissioner’s assertion that the existence or absence of a
lease has no bearing on whether an R.C. 5709.08 exemption applies is contrary to
this court’s precedent. In Carney v. Cleveland, 173 Ohio St. 56, 180 N.E.2d 14,
at paragraph two of the syllabus, we held that a portion of a city-owned airport
leased to private entities was not exempt. The lessees constructed aircraft hangars
on the leased premises at their expense, and the hangars remained under the
lessees’ management and control and were largely, if not exclusively, devoted to
the lessees’ business. Id. at 58. Our holding was based on the principle that
under a lease, “an element of ownership passes to the lessees, and such property
thereby loses its identity as public property used exclusively for a public
purpose.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. The existence of the lease and the
legal effect of the leasehold were central to our holding. More recently, we relied
on Carney in Parma Hts. to affirm the denial of an exemption under R.C.
5709.08. Compare Whitehouse, 72 Ohio St.3d at 180, 648 N.E.2d 503 (although
the farmer grew “crops on the [public] property, and, apparently, earn[ed] some
minimal profit from this activity,” it was “significant that no lease govern[ed] the
relationship between the farmer and the village”). While the existence or absence
of a lease may not be determinative, it is relevant to whether public property is
used exclusively for a public purpose.
{¶ 29} Neither Cincinnati nor CRC entered into a lease with Golf
Management. Bigham testified that CRC chose not to lease the golf courses
because it wanted to retain control: “We wanted to make sure that we could
approve the rates, approve the operation, approve exactly what went on there on a
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day-to-day basis * * *.” Livingood similarly testified that Golf Management did
not intend to lease the golf courses from CRC.
{¶ 30} Three circumstances additionally justify rejecting the tax
commissioner’s argument that the relationship between CRC and Golf
Management is the functional equivalent of that between a lessor and lessee.
First, the management contracts contain no language granting Golf Management
the right of possession and, in particular, the concomitant right to exclude others
from the property. Although the contracts grant Golf Management “exclusive
responsibility and control over all areas and structures within the boundaries of
the golf premises,” that language appears in the section of the contract entitled
“Scope of Services” and does not amount to a transfer of an element of ownership
to Golf Management; the “Scope of Services” details Golf Management’s duties,
and the grant of control simply confers the authority necessary to carry out those
duties. Second, Golf Management did not act as a lessee in possession, inasmuch
as it did not limit Cincinnati’s access to and supervision of the golf courses. CRC
did not require Golf Management’s permission to enter onto the properties, and
CRC employees went to the golf courses every day. The daily presence of city
personnel negates any implication that Golf Management obtained or exercised an
exclusive possessory right. Finally, the management contracts most obviously
differ from a lease by the absence of any provision for rent, or any other payment
that functionally constituted compensation for a right to exercise possession. See
Black’s Law Dictionary 1024 (10th Ed.2014) (defining “lease” as “[a] contract by
which a rightful possessor of real property coveys the right to use and occupy the
property in exchange for consideration, usu. rent”).

The main payment

contemplated by the management contracts is a fixed management fee, which
CRC pays in consideration for the performance of precisely defined duties. For
these reasons, we reject the tax commissioner’s argument that Golf Management
acted as the functional equivalent of a lessee.
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{¶ 31} In a final argument, encompassed within the first proposition of
law, the tax commissioner asserts that Cincinnati’s method of operating its golf
courses via a private management company harms competitors and taxpayers,
with the result that the city’s courses are not used exclusively for a public
purpose. The commissioner cites testimony from Macke, who complained that
Golf Management lowered the greens fees on city golf courses in an effort to
“drive people through the door to sell food and beverage.”
{¶ 32} With due respect to Macke’s difficult position in a city and county
that are, as he put it, “saturated” with public golf courses, the decision to lower
greens fees does not negate the public purpose of Cincinnati’s golf courses. To
the contrary, lower greens fees arguably advance the public purpose of making
the city courses more accessible to the golfing public. CRC has, in fact, refused a
request by Golf Management to increase greens fees when it concluded that a rate
increase would harm CRC’s public mission. Traditionally, public parks charge
little or nothing for the public to access their amenities, and greater access to
everyone without regard to their ability to pay constitutes a part of their public
mission, not a refutation of it.
{¶ 33} The tax commissioner argues that the city behaved essentially as a
commercial golf-course owner and has used the “competitive advantage” of the
tax exemption to harm private competition. The testimony demonstrates that
private management of Cincinnati’s golf courses has reduced Cincinnati’s
overhead costs. But the fact remains that by lowering costs, Cincinnati can lower
fees and still maintain the viability of its golf operations. We cannot accept the
theory that those developments are inimical to the public purpose, given that
reducing costs enhances public access to the recreational opportunity that
Cincinnati is affording.

14

January Term, 2015

Conclusion
{¶ 34} The BTA acted reasonably and lawfully by determining that
Cincinnati did not forfeit its exemption under R.C. 5709.08(A) when it hired a
private management company to manage its golf courses. We affirm the decision
of the BTA.
Decision affirmed.
O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER, O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and
O’NEILL, JJ., concur.
__________________
Terrance A. Nestor, Interim City Solicitor, and Marion E. Haynes III,
Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Daniel W. Fausey and Daniel G.
Kim, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellant.
Wood & Lamping, L.L.P., Jeffrey D. Forbes, and Gregory G. Laux, urging
affirmance for amicus curiae city of Mason, Ohio.
Gary F. Franke Co., L.P.A., and William M. Bristol, urging reversal for
amicus curiae Paul Macke.
__________________
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